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ABSTRACT
Recommendations are made for improving intelligent
system reliability and usability based on the use of
information requirements in system development.
Information requirements define the task-relevant messages
exchanged between the intelligent system and the user by
means of the user interface medium. Thus, these
requirements affect the design of both the intelligent system
and its user interface. Many difficulties that users have
interacting with intelligent systems are caused by
information problems. These information problems result
from (1) not providing the right information to support
domain tasks, and (2) not recognizing that using an
intelligent system introduces new user supervisory tasks
that require new types of information. These problems are
especially prevalent in intelligent systems used for real-time
space operations, where data problems and unexpected
situations are common. Information problems can be
solved by deriving information requirements from a
description of user tasks. Using information requirements
embeds human-computer interaction design into intelligent
system prototyping, resulting in intelligent systems that
are more robust and easier to use.
INTRODUCTION
Many difficulties that users have interacting with intelligent
systems are caused by information problems. These
problems are especially prevalent in systems used for real-
time operations, where timing constraints make it essential
that intelligent systems communicate effectively with their
users (users in space operations are called operators). The
following example illustrates a typical information problem
in this environment.
Example: A user's task is to detect event Y, which
occurs when sensor A is bad and switch B is off. The
intelligent system displays the currentstatus of sensor
A and state of switch B. If a change in the displayed
value from either sensor A or switch B occurs before
the user looks at the display, the user misses event Y.
On the surface, the problem with this system appears to be
caused by "bad" user interface design (i.e., overwriting the
display of data from sensor A and switch B before event Y
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can be detected). A closer look, however, reveals that the
so-called bad user interface is merely a symptom of an
underlying information problem (i.e., the information of
interest is event Y, but the intelligent system does not
provide that information).
This paper characterizes the information problems
encountered when building intelligent systems for real-time
space operations, and makes design recommendations for
solving these problems. These results are based on
experience gained in designing intelligent systems for space
operations at the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA). The authors have extended their
design experience with case studies of intelligent systems
built and used at NASA (Malin, et al., 1991). They have
also collaborated with Woods and Potter (Woods, et al.,
1991; Potter and Woods, 1991) concerning new user
interface designs addressing some of these information
problerns.
This paper was written to assist intelligent system
designers in designing for more effective communication
with users, and to inform intelligent system tool builders
and human factors engineees of ways to better support these
system designers. The first section describes the
information problems encountered in real-time space
operations. The next section introduces the concept of
information requirements as an approach to handing these
information problems. The third section discusses the
design of intelligent systems for effective communication
with users. This includes describing the information needed
to monitor the domain system and supervise the intelligent
system, and proposing alternatives to typical user interface
design approaches. The final section summarizes how these
recommendations improve intelligent system reliability and
usability. The topics discussed in this paper are covered in
greater detail in a NASA Technical Memorandum (Malin
and Schreckenghost, 1992).
INFORMATION PROBLEMS IN REAL-TIME
SPACE OPERATIONS
A key observation from the case studies is that many
perceived user interface problems in intelligent systems are
actually information problems. These information
problems result from (1) not providing the right
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information to supportdomain tasks, and (2) not
recognizing that an intelligent system introduces new user
supervisory tasks that require new types of information.
These problems are made more difficult by failure to
consider how intelligent systems operate in space
environments (e.g., effect of data quality and availability on
intelligent system behavior) and failure to integrate
intelligent system operations with other operations. If not
solved, these information problems impact intelligent
system reliability and usability.
The first information problem is failure to provide the right
information to support domain tasks. The most common
tasks performed by intelligent systems being built today are
fault monitoring, detection, and diagnosis of cause. The
information needed tO perform these tasks includes the
important behaviors, interesting relationships, and
significant changes occurring in the domain system, i.e.,
monitored process (Woods, et al., 1991). To interpret this
information, the operator must also understand the behavior
expected to occur, and the thresholds delimiting significant
or interesting changes (i.e., transition points). For
example, many of the operator's decisions during fault
management require information about functional capability
(what functionality has been lost, how the mission is
impacted by that loss). Yet the information typically
communicated by the intelligent system consists of device
failures shown on schematics or listed in message logs.
Such communication does not support the operator in
identifying the important changes (e.g., lost functionality)
and relationships (e.g, bow failures impact mission goals).
Considerable effort is required to use this information to
make fault management decisions. Thus, common practice
in communicating with the operator does not provide the
information needed to make fault management decisions.
The second information problem is failure to design for user
supervision. New user supervisory tasks include both
monitoring ongoing intelligent system activities, and
guiding and correcting the system when it malfunctions.
Intelligent systems are usually not designed to be managed
because it is not well recognized that they need to be
managed. This omission in design arises from two
misconceptions: (1) that the intelligent system is more
knowledgeable than its user, and (2) that the intelligent
system can be designed to prevent all errors from occurring.
In fact, the typical space operations user (a flight controller)
is also a domain expert. This expert user is more
knowledgeable than the intelligent system and is well
qualified to Supervise it. The misconception that all
intelligent system errors can be prevented results from
unrealistic assumptions about the space operations
environment and how intelligent systems operate within
that environment. Due to the complexity of this
environment, the behavior of the monitored process cannot
always be accurately predicted, and unexpected situations
occur. Because they are unexpected, the knowledge base
does not address them and the intelligent system can
respond anomalously. Additionally, data problems (e.g.,
stale, noisy, or biased data) are common in space
environments and can cause intelligent system error.
Although intelligent systems can be designed for
supervision and correction (Land et al., 1992), they are not
typically designed that way. Often, the intelligent system
provides no means for the user to respond to system errors,
apart from turning the system off. If not designed for user
supervision, the intelligent system can also be difficult to
understand (what Abbott calls a "magical" system; Abbott,
1991) because it doesn't provide the user with necessary
information about system processing. The human
supervisor must understand what the intelligent system can
do (its capabilities), what it is currently doing (its
activities), and why (its reasoning strategies). Without
such an understanding, the supervisor cannot guide and
correct it. Providing this additional information to
supervise the intelligent system can overload the user,
however, if it is not effectively managed. Because the
intelligent system is embedded in a larger support system,
information from that larger system can be used when
compensating for intelligent system errors (e.g., operator
can use that information to take over intelligent system
tasks).
INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS FOR
SYSTEM DESIGN
The information problems in real-time space operations that
were discussed in the previous section can be characterized
as not providing the right information at the right time to
support fault management tasks for the monitored process
and user supervisory tasks for the intelligent system. An
understanding of both of these types of tasks is necessary to
determine what the "right" information is and when it
should be provided. Using a description of these tasks, the
designer can define the task-relevant messages exchanged
between the intelligent system and the user by means of the
user interface medium (i.e., the information requirements).
These information requirements are then used in designing
the system. Because they are based on a description of how
the user will interact with the intelligent system,
information requirements include operational considerations
early in system design.
Information requirements affect the design of both the
intelligent system (i.e., what information to represent) and
its user interface (i.e., what information to present). Thus,
intelligent system design and user interface design are not
independent efforts, but aspects of a single development
process. Considering human-computer interaction (HCI) as
part of system development integrates user interface design
into overall system design. Since information requirements
affect both intelligent system and user interface design, HCI
expertise is needed throughout the development of the
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system. Early in system development, HCI expertise is
needed for describing task-level information requirements.
Knowledge of display and control software and hardware is
needed to design media for presenting this information,
which may include early development of user interface
design concepts as prototypes or storyboards. This
approach also necessarily involves users early in system
design to describe the task and assist in identifying
information requirements.
A task-based approach to requirements definition solves
many of the information problems described earlier.
Identifying information requirements does not require a full
tack analysis, such as the GOMS analysis (Kieras, 1988).
Only the high-level monitoring, control, and decision-
making tasks for managing the monitored process and
supervising the intelligent system need be identified (see
next section for an illustration). Finer-grained task analysis
techniques are not appropriate for this purpose, because they
are designed for detailed user interface design at the dialogue
or display level.
There is much yet to be learned about how to develop high-
level task descriptions for the purpose of identifying
information requirements. Formal methods will most
likely evolve from approaches proposed by Rasmussen
(1986) and Mitchell and Miller (1986), and from distributed
agent communication approaches from artificial
intelligence. In the interim, information requirements can
be identified by developing and informally analyzing
scenarios. Such scenarios would include the identified joint
human-computer tasks, and would represent managing both
the monitored process and the intelligent system. These
scenarios are evaluated to identify the information that must
be exchanged between the user and the intelligent system.
Alternative task allocations can also be evaluated for ability
to recover from intelligent system errors, to accommodate
changes in task priority or workload, and to coordinate
human and intelligent system activities. Both prototypes
and storyboards can be used to evaluate operational
scenarios.
Information requirements are the basis for selecting what
infom_ation should be represented and presented for a task.
This guarantees that all the needed information, and only
the needed information, is provided. This solves the
i:,formation problems related to magical systems and
iLformation overload. Additionally, information
requirements provide a more objective and rigorous basis for
"valuating a design than the usual approach in which a
resign is good if the users like it (what Abbott calls design
by "Mikey likes it";Abbott, 1992).
COMMUNICATION BETWEEN HUMAN AND
INTELLIGENT SYSTEM
Effective human-computer communication requires striking
a balance. On one hand, the intelligent system must
provide enough information for the user to understand its
behavior (i.e., avoiding a magical system). On the other
hand, the intelligent system must not provide so much
information that it interrupts or distracts the user from more
important tasks. The user is already overloaded with
information. The problem of information overload
becomes especially important in real-time environments
where complex, high risk tasks are performed, and where
human errc_ can represent serious risk.
Most of the intelligent systems studied communicate with
the user in at least one of the following ways:
• message list:a chronologicallist of stateand
status assessments and/or action recommond_ons
• annotated schematic: a graphic representation of
the physical structure of the system, annotated
with sensor measurements or state/status
assessments
• explanation: a conversational style of providing
justification for an intelligent system conclusion
These typical approaches to communication are not
effective at achieving balanced communication. They often
do not represent the right type of information fog user tasks
or do not present it in a way effectively supporting real-
time operations.
Balanced communication is achieved by developing ashared
understanding of the ongoing situation, so that the
intelligent system and user make decisions based on the
same information. Such an makrstanding is developed over
time by monitoring the same information, including the
environmental events, the actions of the crew and flight
controllers,and thebehaviorof both the monitored process
and the intelligent system in response to those events and
actions. Understanding the behavior of a system and its
capabifities to respond to a situation requires having some
"visibility" into the system. Providing visibility is
providing an unobstructed vies, to the user. To be
unobstructed, nothing should get in the way of sight (i.e.,
information is clearly presented, with the relevant
information apparent). A vies, includes a perspective.
Information for visibility into the monitored process is
represented from the perspective of managing process
operations and failures. Information for visibility into the
intelligent system is represented from the perspective of
coordinating with and managing operations and errors in
this system. This section describes the types of
information needed for both of these perspectives, and
discusses alternatives to the traditional forms of
communication.
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Information for Managing the Monitored
Process
Managing the monitored process requires that the operator
monitor wocess behavior for anomalies and respond to
those anomalies. To detect anomalies, the operator must
have some expectation of what process behavior should be
(i.e., nominal behavior). Typically° an alarm is
atmunciated when behavior is not within the limits defining
nominal behavior. Multiple alarms may be issued shortly
after the initial alarm due to failure propagation into other
systems and redundant alarms. Additionally, anomalies can
have serious implications for safety and mission objectives,
and can impose hard timing constraints. Thus, managing
information from multiple alarms increases workload just at
the time when the operator can least afford it.
Responding to anomalies in space systems is a complex
decision-making process, often with high stakes (e.g.,
potential loss of crew, failure of costly experiment). The
operator must make the following decisions when an
anomaly occms:
• DeAermine if any action is required in response to
the anomaly
• Distinguish failures from false alarms
• If more than one response is possible, select one
• When action is taken, evaluate if it is effective
A significant amount of information is needed to make
these decisions. The cause of the anomaly (or a set of
possible causes) must be identified. The impacts of the
anomaly must be determined, including the immediate
consequences to mission objectives and safety (e.g., lost
functionality) and the potential for future consequences
(e.g., failure propagation potential). Response options
must be delineated and the "best" response enacted. The
effect of response procedures must also be monitored for
adverse or unexpected effects.
To support alarm management and anomaly response, the
intelligent system should provide information that
improves the operator's understanding of the situation.
This requires focusing the operator's attention on what is
diagnostically important, and quickly and clearly indicating
the diagnostic contentandrelationships in this information.
Especially when the system supports operations that change
process states, it is important to call attention to events
(e.g., state transitions) and procedure-driven activities (e.g.,
configuration changes) preceding the anomaly, as context
for interpreting an anomaly. The example in Figtm_ 1
illustrates how knowledge of pn_Aing events can ass/st the
operator in managing the monitored process.
ALARM INFORMATION ONLY
A false alarm is caused by a misconfigured sensor. Only alarm information is provided to the opera/or.
[ l"Alarm: /
Time-'---I_ IMU 2 Failur_J
INFORMATION ABOUT RELATED EVENTS MID ACTIVITIES
Knowledge d imporlant events preoed_ the _ can mist In InlliqXelling the alltm. Since ¢:l@vkats
otlen power up in • _ ee_llgurillon, knowledge of tlle recent power up 04 IMU 2 alerts the
ope_or ol a IX_ei_,W mis©ontbumdsensor.
_lr Ng
Time
INFORMATION ABOUT CAUSE OF THE ALARM
The inleiUgenl syslem can be_ler support Ihe opera/or by providing information about the cause of the
alarm. The IS determines tirol IMU 2 is misconfigured before issuing the false alarm.
I "7
I Time
v v I
S eled IMU 2 I
NAV nrimR_l_J
I lMU 2 not NAV |
configured. J
IMU 2 NAV l
configured I
Figure 1 - Using Knowledge of Preceding Events to Improve Operator Understanding of Situation
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Bothmessage lists and schematics can obscure intelligent
system information important to the operator (Woods, et al,
1991). As shown in the example, situations develop as
patterns of events indicated by changing state and status.
Schematics can only present the latest event (i.e., the
current state). Additionally, ff events are not related to
physical structure (e.g., functional status), they can be
difficult to present clearly using a schematic. Message lists
do capture some event history, but do not represent the
relationships between events (e.g., the temporal distance
between events) necessary to reveal these patterns. Since
chronology is the means of sorting messages, related
information can become dissociated. Intelligent system
designers should consider alternatives to message lists and
schematics that assist the operator in seeing patterns of
events as they occur. For example, Potter and Woods are
investigating timelines as an alternative to message lists
(Potter and Woods, 1991). Representation of functional
information instead of physical information can be effective
for supporting anomaly response (Malin et al., 1991).
Information for Supervising the Intelligent
System
Possibly the most significant problem in intelligent system
design is failure to recognize that use of an intelligent
system poses new tasks for the operator. In addition to
managing the monitored process, the operator must now
supervise the intelligent system, including monitoring and
coordinating its activities, and responding to its errors. But
intelligent system are rarely designed for supervision. The
traditional means of communicating with an intelligent
system (message lists, schematics, and explanation) do not
support the operator in monitoring its activities and
understanding its reasoning. And, when system errors
occur, the operator usually has few options for responding
to them (the restart button or the power plug).
Designing the intelligent system for supervision means
providing adequate information for the operator to
understand what it is doing and to know how to respond to
its errors (i.e., providing visibility into the intelligent
system). Similar to providing visibility into the monitored
process, providing visibility into the intelligent system
means making important system behavior evident as a
situation develops (i.e., conclusions and reasoning
strategies). It means showing intelligent system activities
in progress and how well these activities are achieving
goals. It also means informing the operator of the critical
evidence used to draw a conclusion and the confidence in
that conclusion (hypothesis or conclusion). This
information should be presented in a way that reinforces the
operator's understanding of the intelligent system's
reasoning strategy (Chandrasekaran, et al., 1989). Thus,
managing the intelligent system means providing a lot of
new information to the operator. There is a risk of
overloading the operator if the system is not carefully
designed to assist the operator in performing these new
tasks and managing the new information needed for these
tasks.
Explanation is the common approach to providing
visibility into the intelligent system. Most explanation
systems operate retrospectively (like help systems),
requiring the operator to wait until after a situation has
stabilized (and the intelligent system has reached a
conclusion) before attempting to get an explanation. In
real-time support environments, the operator often cannot
afford to wait until system behavior stabilizes, for the
safety impacts may be too great. Such event reconstruction
is-also not sufficient for coordinating shared human-
computer activities. Additionally, the conversational style
of explanation can be distracting and can contribute to
information ovedmd.
Even if the operator had time to interrupt ongoing activities
for an explanation, a problem would remain with traditional
approaches to explanation. Affecting the operator's
behavior requires that the operator both understand the
meaning and consequences of the explanation, and accept
them as correct. Most explanation systems assume that
failure to influence user behavior occurs because the user
does not understand the explanation, and continue to provide
more detailed justification directed at improving
understanding. Contrary to this assumption, acceptance
does not necessarily result fi-om understanding. The user
may understand the intended meaning but choose not to
believe it, due to information unknown to the intelligent
system or not considered by it. Or the user may believe the
information but be unwilling to alter behavior, due to the
belief that adverse side-effects will result or that the
consequences of altering behavior are of no significance.
Typical explanation approaches ignore the better
information available to expert users such as flight
controllers. Explanations should provide the kind of
intelligent system visibility that effectively supports real-
time detection of intelligent system anomalies, and even
diagnosis and formulation of responses.
Thus, alternatives to explanation should both avoid the heed
for retrospective dialogue and supp_ the user's supervisocy
task. A promising approach is for the human and
intelligent system to share information and representations.
Using the same information, the user can follow
operational situations and compare conclusions with
intelligent system assessments, as a part of normal
monitoring and control operations. A good first step is to
clarify intelligent system reasoning by displaying plots or
tables of critical evidence supporting its conclusions, as
shown in Figure 2. This example also illustrates use of the
following information to support user understanding of the
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monitored profess thatparallelsthedata used for intelligent
system assessments:
Present information describing the situation as it
develops, including both monitored process
behavior and intelligent system activities.
• Establish expectations about what might happen
next (e.g., annotate data with predictions).
Identify critical transitions and regimes of behavior
(both current and pending; e.g., process or task
information to annotate displays, Forbes, 1991).
Such information both supports the operator's tasks and
provides some on-the-job training, by reinforcing the
operator's mental models of both the monitored process and
the intelligent system.
A representation shared between agents is prevalent as the
basis of communication in many domains, including
humans advising robots using a shared task representation
(Martin and Firby, 1991), distributed machine agents
planning tasks using shared goals (Decker, et al., 1991),
and designers developing shared mental models (Sycara and
Lewis, 1991). Shared representations are achieved by
designing the intelligent system's representation to
correspond to the expert operator's representation for
performing the management tasks. To achieve this, it may
be necessary to make implicit task information explicit in
the intelligent system (e.g., to support robot advice-taking
in Martin and Firby, 1991).
The concept of shared representations supports development
of common knowledge between the user and the intelligent
system. If intelligent system conclusions can be
represented in a way that is se_evident to the nset, such an
intelligent system can become serf-explanatory. With such
a system, the nse_ would not need to analyze the details of
intelligent system reasoning. Less attention and time
would be needed to effectively supervise the intelligent
system.
CONCLUSION
The information problems described in this paper can cause
many intelligent system design problems. A solution to
these problems has been proposed based on designing from
information requirements. Design recommendations have
been made for improving hanum-comput_ communication
of this information. The impact of these problems on
intelligent system reliability end usability is now desm'bed,
and the benefits of solving these problems delineated.
ReAiabili_ is a ori_al design iss_ since m unreliable and
uncontrollableintelligentsystemcan impactthesafetyof
crew and space systems.Intelligent_s thatdo not
perform reliably cannot successfully provide real-time
decision suPlX3_ Thus, solving those problems affecting
reliability should be of first primity to the intelligent
system designm-. Information problems affecting system
reliability (shown in italics) and recommendations for
solving these Im3blems are sumnmrized below:
The design may fail to support the user in supervising
intelligent system activities and recovering from
intelligent system errors.
Designing the intelligent system for supervision means
keeping the user _ ofi_ conclusions, behavior,
capabilities,andreasoning strategies in the contextof
INTELLIGENT SYSTEM CONCLUSIONS WITH EVIDENCE
Intelligent System Messages
2:20 Potential for loss of control of vehicle
PollntiaJ
LOC
<_1 12_30
Time 2:20 - IS concludes potentlalLOC
Intelligent System Messages
2:30 Loss of control of vehicle.
2:20 Potential for loss of control of vehicle
_ 1 2:10 2:20 2:30
Time (see)
Time 2:30 - IS concludes LOC of vehicle
Figure 2 - Displaying Evidence Supporting Intelligent System Conclusions
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ongoing events. It means providing the user with
some recourse when intelligent system errors occur,
such as reaHocating intelligent system tasks to the
user. To permit such task reallocation, information
from data sources other than the intelligent system
should be accessible, and independent of intelligent
system conclusions.
The design may fail to handle bad or unavailable data,
or unexpected situations.
Robustness to data deficiencies and unexpected
situations is achieved by minimizing the bad data
processed by the intelligent system and by providing
capability to recover from errors. Methods include
providing for data preprocessing and system self-
correction (e.g., retract inconsistent conclusions), and
designing for user supervision.
Intelligent system activises, reasoning strategies, and
capabilities may be misunderstood and often
overestimated by the user (i.e., a magical system).
To avoid building magical systems, it is necessary to
provide dynamic feedback about ongoing system
activities, and to reinforce the user's understanding of
system capabilities. This information should be
integrated into a display of the overall situation that
develops over time. This permits the user to develop
an understanding of system activities as they occur
instead of trying to retrospectively develop such an
understanding after problems occur.
Information problems also impact intelligent system
usability. Intelligent systems that are difficult to use have
an increased risk of user rejection and user errors. Solving
problems affecting usability should improve the chances of
intelligent system success. Information problems affecting
system usability (shown in italics) and recommendations
for solving these problems are summarized below:
Common practice in user interface design may increase
user workload and fail to provide the important, task-
relevant information (i.e., message lists, schematics,
and explanaaon ).
Deficiencies in user interface design result from
misunderstanding what information is needed by the
user. The user interface should be designed from a
description of the task-based information requirements.
This information should be presented to illustrate
situations as they develop, including the behavior of
both the monitored wocess and the intelligent system.
Alternatives to explanation should clarify intelligent
system conclusions and reasoning strategies, including
the evidence supporting these conclusions.
The intelligentsystemmay notbe integratedwiththe
supportsystent
Usuallythe intelligentsystemdoes notoperateas a
stand-alonesystem,butisinsteadembedded inalarger
support system. Information from the intelligent
system must be integrated with the sources of
operational data, and the intelligent system displays
must be integrated with other displays.
The intelligent system may notbe designed for
coordination with the user.
Designing for coordination requires avoiding
unnecessary interruptions or interference in user
activities. Changes in task allocation and dependencies
between tasks (including required information
exchange) represent points of coordination that
constrain the design. An essential element of
coordinating shared tasks is providing feedback about
ongoing intelligent system activities.
Applying these recommendations improves safety and
reduces cost. Building reliable intelligent systems reduces
safety threats due to system error. Building usable systems
reduces the potential for user error and improves user
acceptance. This reduces the chance of the system not
being used, and minimizes costly redesign of the system.
The results are safer operations using intelligent systems
and reduced cost of building these systems.
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